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Abstract
We extend the Church encoding of the Booleans and two-valued Boolean Logic in λ-calculus to
encodings of n-valued sequential propositional logic (for 3 ≤ n ≤ 5) in well-chosen infinitary
extensions in λ-calculus. In case of three-valued logic we use the infinitary extension of the finite
lambda calculus in which all terms have a unique normal form in which their Böhm tree can be
recognised. The construction can be refined for n ∈ {4, 5}.
The three n-valued logics so obtained are variants of McCarthy’s left-sequential three-valued
proposition calculus. The four-valued logic has been described by Bergstra. The five-valued
logic seems new, but closely related to a five-valued logic proposed by Bergstra and Ponse in the
context of Process Algebras. The encodings of these n-valued logics are of interest because they
can be used to calculate the truth values of infinite closed propositions. With a novel application
of McCarthy’s three-valued logic we can now resolve Russell’s paradox.
We make the speculation that Church could have found a similar encoding of three-valued
logic in own λI-calculus, because of the simplifying fact that Böhm trees are always finite in
λI-calculus.
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In memory of Corrado Böhm
Böhm’s theorem [7] was instrumental in proving the equivalence between an operational
semantics and a denotational semantics of the λ-calculus and inspired Barendregt [3, 4] to
define the concept of Böhm tree, a first version of which has been introduced by Böhm and
Dezani [8]. Böhm trees have later been redefined as the normal forms in a well-chosen infin-
itary extension of λ-calculus by Kennaway et al. [20]. Böhm trees and their generalisations
are now another established way to capture the semantic content of a λ-term [19, 30]. This
paper is an application of Böhm trees in the latter sense.
1 Motivation and overview
In this paper we will extend the well-known Church encoding of Boolean logic into λ-calculus
to an encoding of three-valued logic into a suitable infinitary extension of λ-calculus that
identifies all unsolvables by ⊥. By way of motivation we consider Russell’s paradox.
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2 Many-valued logics inside λ-calculus: Church’s rescue of Russell with Böhm trees
1.1 Russell’s Paradox
This paradox arises if we, somewhat naïvely, consider the set R of all sets that are not a
member of themselves and then wonder whether R ∈ R. We get as paradoxical consequence
that R ∈ R if and only if R /∈ R. At the heart of this paradox lies a λ-term (the application
pp is interpreted as p 3 p)
P ≡ (λp.¬(pp))(λp.¬(pp))
with the following infinite reduction
P → ¬P → ¬¬P → ¬¬¬P → . . .
The limit ¬(¬(¬(. . .))) of this reduction is an infinite proposition. Unexpected, perhaps,
but not necessarily paradoxical.
In the past [19, 30] we have developed a family of infinitary λ-calculi, each depending
on a set of meaningless terms. The set US of unsolvable λ-terms is a prominent example.
The corresponding infinitary extension λ∞β⊥US of the finite λ-calculus λβ is corresponding
and normalising for a suitable notion of possibly infinite reduction. The normal forms of the
finite λ-terms correspond with their Böhm trees. The Böhm trees of the unsolvables are ⊥.
So with this in mind, we are no longer afraid of infinite terms. The Church encoding of
a finite λ-term results in a finite λ-term and the encoding of an infinite term, like the one
above, just results in an infinite λ-term. Looking careful at the encoding of the finite and
infinite closed propositions we realise that these are either unsolvable or the finite encoding
of one of the Booleans.
1.2 Encoding three-valued logic in infinitary λ-calculus
Thus we are led to extend the Church encoding to an encoding of three-valued logic in
infinitary λ-calculus λ∞β⊥US , by mapping the third value to ⊥. Inspection of the truth tables
then reveals that the Church encoding of Boolean logic now has naturally been extended to
a Church encoding of McCarthy’s three-valued logic. In particular we find that the infinite
term ¬(¬(¬(. . .))) that we encountered in our analysis of Russell’s paradox is nether true or
false but ⊥.
1.3 Encoding four- and five-valued logic
We will further note that the set of unsolvable λ-terms that gets identified by ⊥ can be
split in three subsets closed under infinite reduction and substitution. Repeating the above
construction now with three new truth values we find that the Church encoding also encodes
a five-valued McCarthy-an logic. The four-valued sub-logic has been described earlier by
Bergstra e.a. The five-valued logic shares aspects with, but is different from a five-valued
logic defined by Bergstra and Ponse.
1.4 A speculation about Church
When Church started his work on λ-calculus (at least in 1928, likely earlier, given that his
thesis was ready in 1926 and given his review [9]of Volume 2 and 3 of Principia Mathemat-
ica [32], his motivation was to use the λ-calculus as the basis for a logic that could serve as
the foundation of mathematics [11]. Church’s hope was that by using non-classical logic (in
which he had shown an earlier interest [10]) he could side step the Paradoxes without have to
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introduce Zermelo’s set axioms or Russell’s type theory, that he both judged as somewhat
artificial. He discovered with his students Kleene and Rosser that the lambda definable
function corresponded exactly with the recursive functions [22, 23, 14]. But in the build-up
to that result Kleene and Rosser managed to prove the inconsistency of Church’s logical
system [24] while he himself was still publicly hopeful that his system could be paradox
free [12]. A disaster. Fortunately, the λ-calculus itself was consistent by the Church-Rosser
theorem [16]. Various papers under preparation had to be rewritten. Church rebounded
almost immediately with his formulation of the Church-Turing thesis[14] and his negat-
ive solution of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem [13] (there is no algorithm that can decide
whether a given formula of the first order arithmetic is provable or not).
So could Church have observed that McCarthy’s three-valued logic could be encoded in
his λ-calculus? We have to remember that Church did not work with what is now called
the classical λ-calculus, but with a restricted format, the λI-calculus. There is a Church
encoding for Boolean logic in the λI-calculus. Barendregt has shown that the unsolvable
terms in λI-calculus are exactly the λI-terms without a finite normal form. This makes that
the Böhm tree of a λI-term is either its finite normal form or ⊥. Now the above encoding
of McCarthy’s three-valued logic can be repeated in Church’s λI-calculus. So, we guess that
if Church would have found this result without much troubles, when he had made the step
of considering a rewrite rule M → ⊥ whenever M has not finite normal form. No infinite
terms or reductions are needed in case of λI-calculus. The idea that inside his λ-calculus a
non-classical logic is lurking he may have found pleasing after all.
2 Preliminaries
We will recall notation, concepts and facts from infinitary λ-calculus, while assuming fa-
miliarity with λβ , by which we denote the finite λ-calculus with β-reduction and no η-
reduction [15, 4]. We will use → and → for respectively one step β-reduction and finite
step β-reduction. We will use ≡ to indicate syntactical identity. We will use the following
special terms.
K ≡ λxy.y Ω ≡ (λx.xx)λx.xx
I ≡ λx.x Θ ≡ (λxy(y(xxy))λxy(y(xxy)
Finite reduction in λβ is confluent but not normalising. A finite term like Θx has an
infinite reduction
Θx→ x(Θx)→ xx(Θx)→ . . .
This is a converging reduction (think of terms as trees and take the standard metric on
trees) with an infinite term as limit:
xxx . . .
We can add infinite λ-terms to the finite λ-terms by reading the usual syntax definition
(where x ranges over some countable set of variables) of finite λ-terms coinductively:
M ::= x | λx.M | (MM)
We will write Λ∞ for this set of finite and infinite λ-terms. Using → for a possibly infinite
converging reduction, we can now write
Θx→ xxx . . .
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Later in the paper we will encounter the infinite term λyλyλy . . ., which is the limit of the
converging reduction
ΘK→ K(ΘK)→ λy.ΘK→ λyλy.ΘK→ λyλyλy.ΘK→ λyλyλy . . .
Hence some finite terms without a finite normal form now have converging reductions to
a possibly infinite normal form. We have don’t have confluence for finite and converging
reductions. The finite term (λx.I(xx))(λx.I(xx)) has a finite reduction to Ω and an infinite
converging reduction to III . . .. Both reducts have the property that they can only reduce
to themselves. Hence they can not joined by either finite or converging reductions.
It is possible to build many different infinitary extensions of λβ which are confluent and
normalising for finite and convergent reductions and finite and infinite terms [20, 21, 19, 30].
We need to do three things. First, we choose a set U of finite lambda terms. Second, we
add a new symbol ⊥U to the syntax of lambda terms and consider the set Λ∞⊥ of finite and
infinite terms over the extended coinductive syntax. Third, we add a new reduction ⊥U -rule
on Λ∞⊥ that will allow us to identify the terms of U by the new symbol ⊥U . We apply this
rule as follows. This rule works on terms of the form C[M ] ∈ Λ∞⊥ ,as follows: whenever
M⊥U := Ω ∈ U
we may reduce as follows
C[M ]→⊥U C[⊥U ]
For a given U we denote this infinite extension by λ∞β⊥U . In a series of papers [20, 21, 19, 30]
we have determined a necessary and sufficient collection of Axioms that the set U must
satisfy in order for λ∞β⊥U to a converging and normalising infinite λ-calculus.
We call such sets meaningless sets. The choice of a meaningless set U is akin the choice
of a semantics for lambda calculus: the normal forms in λ∞β⊥U together form a model of the
λ-calculus. The intuition is that the elements of a meaningless sets are undefined/ have no
meaning/ are insignificant. In order for this model to be consistent, U has to be a proper
subset of Λ∞. Here is the list of axioms:
I Definition 2.1 ([30]). U ⊆ Λ∞ is called a set of (finite or infinite) meaningless terms, if
it satisfies the axioms of meaninglessness:
1. Axiom of Root activeness: R ⊆ U . (R defined below)
2. Axiom of Closure under β-reduction: If M → β N implies N ∈ U for all M ∈ U .
3. Axiom of Closure under Substitution: If M ∈ U then any substitution instance of M is an
element of U .
4. Axiom of (Weak) Overlap: Either for each λx.P ∈ U , there is some W ∈ U such that
P → β Wx , or alternatively (λx.P )Q ∈ U , for any Q ∈ Λ∞⊥ .
5. Axiom of Indiscernibility: Define M U↔ N if M can be transformed into N by replacing
pairwise disjoint subterms of M in U by terms in U . If M U↔ N then M ∈ U ⇔ N ∈ U .
6. Axiom of Consistency: U 6= Λ.
This construction we were inspired by the definition of Böhm tree [4]. If one takes for
U the set US of unsolvables [1], then the infinite lambda calculus λ∞β⊥US is confluent and
normalising for β⊥US reduction. Any finite λ-term M has a unique normal form in λ∞β⊥US ,
which can be used as alternative definition of the Böhm tree of M . Here a (possible infinite)
closed termM in Λ∞ is called solvable ifMN1 . . . Nk = I for some sequence N1, . . . , Nk with
k ≥ 0. An open lambda term is called solvable if its closure is solvable. A lambda terms is
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called unsolvable if it is not solvable. The set of unsolvables is the largest set for which this
construction works.
The smallest meaningless set [20, 5] is the set R of terms that are root active (also called
mute or top terminating). A lambda term M is root active if any reduct of M can further
reduce to a redex. The classical root active term is Ω. The unsolvable ΩI is not root active.
Note that the definition of a root active terms allows for free variables. The normal forms
in λ∞β⊥R of the Berarducci tree of M .
The Lévy-Longo trees can be obtained if one performs this construction over the set of
terms without a weak head normal form. In general there are more than uncountably many
meaningless sets [30] The collection of normal forms of each such λ∞β⊥U is a model of the
lambda calculus λβ . The axioms are chosen such that different sets give rise to different,
consistent models.
Church considered the terms without finite normal form as insignificant [15, 4]. But the
set of such terms is not a meaningless set [21, 19]. This may have been the implicit reason
behind Church’s choice to work with the λI-calculus instead of λK-calculus, that we have
denoted by λβ . We will return to this in Section 4.
3 Encoding many-valued logic in λ-calculus
In this section we will extend the familiar Church encoding of Boolean logic to many-valid
logic using ideas from Böhm trees and infinitary λ-calculus. Precise references to the Church
encoding we don’t know. As Landin suggests in [26]:
In particular Church and Curry, and McCarthy and the ALGOL 60 authors,
are so large a part of the history of their respective disciplines as to make detailed
attributions inevitably incomplete and probably impertinent.
3.1 Encoding Boolean logic in λ-calculus
In “the History of Lisp” [29] John McCarthy mentions his “invention of the true conditional
expression [if M then N1 else N2] which evaluates only one of Nl and N2 according to
whetherM is true or false” and also his “desire for a programming language that would allow
its use” in the period 1957-8. He also recalls “the conditional expression interpretation of
Boolean connectives” as one of the characterising ideas of LISP. By this he means concretely
the if-then-else construct (when applied to Boolean expressions only) in combination with
the truth values T and F can be used as a basis for propositional logic [28] with the following
natural definitions:
¬M ≡ if M then F else T
M ∧N ≡ if M then N else M
M ∨N ≡ if M then M else N
M→N ≡ if M then N else T
(1)
Barendregt’s book [4] records two elegant encodings of the Booleans and the if-then-else
construct. One encodes into the classical λ-calculus and the other into the more restricted
λI-calculus preferred by Church [11, 15]. The latter we will discuss in Section 4. The former
is the simplest:
T ≡ λxy.x
F ≡ λxy.y
if B then M else N ≡ BMN
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It is easy to see that if-then-else behaves as intended in this encoding. When B reduces to
T and F, we have respectively:
if T then M else N → M
if F then M else N → N (2)
With help of (2) it is straightforward to verify that the standard truth tables of Figure 1 for
Boolean valued propositional logic hold in λ-calculus. Boolean logic commonly deals with
¬
T F
F T
∧ T F
T T F
F F F
∨ T F
T T T
F T F
→ T F
T T F
F T T
Figure 1 Boolean-valued propositional logic
finite propositions. The set of finite propositions can be defined formally with a inductive
syntax, where p ranges over some possibly infinite set of proposition letters:
φ ::= p | T | F | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ→φ) | ¬φ (3)
It is not hard to prove by induction that all closed finite propositions have a unique finite
normal form:
I Lemma 3.1. Let φ be a finite closed proposition. Then φ has a unique finite normal form,
which is either T or F.
3.2 Encoding infinitary propositions in Infinitary λ-Calculus
Infinite propositions can be of use too. They can be used to model certain while statements
like while ¬a test b [6] which is the infinite solution of the recursive equation
W = if a then T else if b then W else W
By reading the syntax definition (3) coinductively we obtain the set of finite or infinite
propositions.
In the introduction we showed how Russell’s paradox leads to the infinite proposition
¬(¬(¬(. . .))). The encoding of this infinite proposition ¬¬¬ . . . in λ-calculus is the infinite
term
(((. . .)FT)FT)FT
which happens to be an infinite left spine.
Not all infinite propositions reduce to infinite left spines: for instance, the infinite pro-
position
P1 ≡ T ∧ (T ∧ . . .) ≡ T ∧ P1 ≡ TP1T ≡ (λxy.x)P1T→ P1
is root active. And some of infinite propositions reduce just to T or F: for instance, the
term
P2 ≡ T ∨ (T ∨ (T ∨ (. . .))) ≡ T ∨ P1 ≡ TTP1 ≡ (λxy.x)TP1 → T
These examples show that some infinite propositions reduce to a Boolean, but not all do.
The latter have in common that their Böhm tree is ⊥.
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I Theorem 3.2. Let φ be a finite or infinite closed proposition. Then the Böhm tree of φ is
either T, F or ⊥.
Proof. By coinduction! J
The missing detail in the above proof follows from the corollary of the next lemma:
I Lemma 3.3. Let U be an unsolvable λ-term in Λ. Then ¬U , U ∧N , U ∨N and U→N
are all unsolvable terms.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. For instance, suppose ¬U is solvable then
(¬U)N1 . . . Nn → I
for some N1, . . . , Nn. But ¬U ≡ UFT. Hence U is solvable. Therefore, unsolvability of U
implies the unsolvability of ¬U . J
I Corollary 3.4. The Böhm trees of ¬⊥, ⊥ ∧N , ⊥ ∨N and ⊥→N are all equal to ⊥.
Proof. Eg., B(¬⊥) = B(¬U) = B(UFT) = ⊥ J
3.3 Encoding three-valued McCarthy logic with help of Böhm trees
Theorem 3.2 suggests an experiment: what logic do we obtain if we repeat the encoding of
section 3.1 with three truth values {T,F,⊥} instead of two? A straightforward calculation
reveals that we get the truth tables in Figure 2. These are exactly the truth tables of
McCarthy’s sequential three valued propositional logic.
¬
T F
F T
⊥ ⊥
∧ T F ⊥
T T F ⊥
F F F F
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
∨ T F ⊥
T T T T
F T F ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
→ T F ⊥
T T F ⊥
F T T T
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
Figure 2 McCarthy’s three-valued sequential three-valued propositional logic
McCarthy discovered three valued-sequential propositional logic in his search for a suit-
able formalism for a mathematical theory of computation [27, 28]. In the context of some
language for computational (partial) functions he introduced conditional expressions of the
form
(p1 → e1, . . . , pn → en)
where the pi are propositional expressions that evaluate to true or false. The idea is that
the value of the whole conditional expression is the value of the expression ei for the first pi
with value true. If all pi have value false than the conditional expression is undefined. To
allow that the evaluation of an expression can be inconclusive, McCarthy stated the rule to
evaluate such conditional expression more precisely:
If an undefined p occurs before a true p or if all p’s are false or if the e corresponding
to the first true p is undefined, the value of the conditional expression is the value of
the e corresponding to the first true p.
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Now the propositional connectives can be defined with help of as conditional expressions.
¬p ≡ (p→ F,T→ T)
p ∧ q ≡ (p→ q,T→ F)
p ∨ q ≡ (p→ T,T→ q)
p→q ≡ (p→ q,T→ T)
(4)
for which McCarthy then derives the very same truth tables of Figure 2.
Guzman and Squier [18] have given a complete axiomatisation of McCarthy’s logic, cf.
Figure 3.
¬T = F
¬⊥ = ⊥
¬¬x = x
¬(x ∧ y) = ¬x ∨ ¬y
x→ y = ¬x ∨ y
x ∧ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∧ z
T ∧ x = x
x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)
(x ∨ y) ∨ z = (x ∧ z) ∨ (¬x ∧ y ∧ z)
(x ∧ y) ∨ (y ∧ x) = (y ∧ x) ∨ (x ∧ y)
Figure 3 Complete axiomatisation of McCarthy’s three-valued sequential propositional logic
I Lemma 3.5. if B0 then B1 else B2 = (B0 ∧ B1) ∨ (¬B0 ∧ B2) for all B0, B1, B2 ∈
{T,⊥,F}.
Proof. After applying the definitions of the logical operators it remains to show that
B0B1B0 = B0B1B0(B0B1B0)(B0FTB2(B0FT)) (5)
The argument now is by inspection.
B0 = T. Then Txy = x. Hence it is sufficient to show that B1 = B1B1F. This follows
by inspection of the three options for B1 ∈ {T,⊥,F}.
B0 = ⊥. Then ⊥B1⊥ = ⊥ = ⊥B1⊥(⊥B1⊥)(⊥FTB2(⊥FT)).
B0 = F. Then it is enough to show that F = FFB2, which follows by inspection of the
three options for B2 ∈ {T,⊥,F}.
J
3.4 Refining the encoding from three-valued to five-valued logic
In the previous section we identified the unsolvable λ-terms with the third truth value ⊥
by taking their Böhm trees, their (possibly infinite) normal form in the infinitary λ-calculus
λ∞β⊥US . We can refine this idea by using the observation of [31] that the set of unsolvables is
the union of three pairwise disjoint sets. Each of these sets gives rise to its own truth value.
These three sets are defined as follows.
I Definition 3.6 ([31]). 1. HA = {M ∈ Λ∞ | M → β N and N is a head active form}
where N is a head active form if M = λx1 . . . xn.RP1 . . . Pk and R is root active.
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2. IL = {M ∈ Λ∞ |M → β N and N is an infinite left spine form} where N is an infinite
left spine form if N = λx1 . . . xn.((. . . P2)P1.
3. O = {M ∈ Λ∞ |M → β O}.
The three sets can be characterised alternatively using the notion of Berarducci tree.
Berarducci tree can show more detail of a term than Böhm trees do. equality on λ-terms
then the Böhm trees do. This allows us to refine the truth value ⊥ of the previous section
into three different truth values.
I Lemma 3.7. 1. M ∈ HA if and only if the Berarducci tree of M is of the form
λx1 . . . xn.⊥N1 . . . Nm
2. M ∈ IL if and only if the Berarducci tree of M is of the form
λx1 . . . xn.(. . . N3N2N1)
3. M ∈ O if and only if the Berarducci tree of M is λx1x2x3 . . ., ie. O.
The setHA is a set of meaningless terms, the other two sets are almost sets of meaningless
terms. Apart from the axiom of root activeness IL and O satisfy all other axioms of
meaninglessness. This allows us to refine the notion of Böhm reduction. Instead of replacing
unsolvable λ-terms by ⊥ we will now replace the elements in HA, IL and O by respectively,
the constants ⊥HA, ⊥IL and ⊥O, so that instead of one ⊥-reduction→⊥ we have now three
reduction rules, called →⊥HA , →⊥IL and →⊥O .
I Theorem 3.8. Let Λ∞⊥HA⊥IL⊥O be the set of finite and infinite λ-terms constructed with
the symbols ⊥HA, ⊥IL and ⊥O. Then the infinitary λ-calculus λ∞β⊥HA⊥IL⊥O is confluent
and normalising for (strongly) convergent reduction.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.7 and the facts from [20] that λ∞β⊥R is confluent and
normalising, and ⊥R-reduction can be postponed over β-reduction. J
We will now encode logic in λ-calculus using the same logical operators as before together
with now five truth values from {T,F,⊥HA,⊥IL,⊥O}. We need an analogue of Corol-
lary 3.4.
I Lemma 3.9. Let U be an λ-term in HA (IL and O). Then ¬U , U ∧ N , U ∨ N and
U→N are all terms in HA (IL and O).
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. For instance, suppose the Berarducci tree of U is of
the form λx1 . . . xn.⊥N1 . . . Nm. Then the Berarducci tree of ¬U is the Berarducci tree of
(λx1 . . . xn.⊥N1 . . . Nm)FT. One easily sees that ¬U is an element of HA. J
I Corollary 3.10. The normal forms of ¬⊥X , ⊥X ∧N , ⊥X ∨N and ⊥X→N are all equal
to ⊥X for X ∈ {HA, IL,O}.
I Theorem 3.11. Let φ be a finite or infinite closed proposition. Then the (possibly infinite)
normal form of φ in λ∞β⊥HA⊥IL⊥O is either T, F or ⊥.
Proof. By coinduction! J
It is straightforward to calculate the truth tables for this five-valued logic. See Figure 4.
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¬
T F
F T
⊥HA ⊥HA
⊥IL ⊥IL
⊥O ⊥O
∧ T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
T T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
F F F F F F
⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA
⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL
⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O
∨ T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
T T T T T T
F T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA
⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL
⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O
→ T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
T T F ⊥HA ⊥IL ⊥O
F T T T T T
⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA ⊥HA
⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL ⊥IL
⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O ⊥O
Figure 4 Five-valued sequential propositional logic
4 Encoding many-valued logic in λI-calculus
The λ-calculus that Church used in his futile attempt for a foundation of mathematics was
the λI-calculus. This calculus differs from the common λ-calculus λβ by the restriction of
its set of λ-terms. Terms in the λI-calculus only contain abstractions of the form λx.M if
x occurs free in M . For example the terms λxy.x and λxy.y that we used for the Booleans
are now forbidden. So we cannot use the Church encoding of Boolean logic as before.
The consequence of this restriction is that terms in the λI-calculus have two pleasant
properties: (i) if a term has a finite normal form, it can not have an infinite reduction, and
(ii) if a term has a finite normal form then any of its subterms must also have a normal
form [15].
4.1 Another encoding of the Booleans
Barendregt gave in fact two encodings for the Booleans in his book [4]. Besides the previous
common encoding of the Booleans he also defined an encoding of the Booleans in the spirit
of Church, because the new encodings of the Booleans are terms in the λI-calculus.
TI = λxy.yIIx
FI = λx.xIII
In this case we can not derive (2). Instead we get
if TI then M else N → NIIM
if FI then M else N → MIIIN (6)
Yet by inspection of each of the four concrete options for M,N ∈ {T,F} we find that
NIIM → M
MIIIN → N (7)
Combining (6) with (7) gives us (2) for all Booleans M,N . Hence also this lesser known
encoding validates the truth tables of Boolean propositional logic.
4.2 Böhm trees in the λI-calculus
Church strongly preferred the λI-calculus over the unrestricted λ-calculus. For him the
natural notion of meaning of a λ-term is its finite normal form, provided it exist. Terms
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without finite normal form are meaningless or, to use his own wording, insignificant [15].
Terms in the λI-calculus have the pleasant property that if they have a finite normal form
then any subterm of them has a finite normal form. In the λI-calculus terms without finite
normal form can safely be identified. In the unrestricted calculus this leads to inconsistency.
cf. [4, Proposition 2.2.4].
In fact Barendregt [2] and Klop [25] have shown that the unsolvable terms in the λI-
calculus are precisely the terms without finite normal form. They did not consider the Böhm
tree construction which simplifies enormously for λI-calculus. We don’t have to consider
infinite terms and infinite reductions. We just add the rule
M →⊥ ⊥, whenever M has no finite normal form.
Let us denote the λI-calculus extended with this rule λIβ⊥. This extension is confluent and
normalising in the finitary sense, and the Böhm tree of any λI-term either equals ⊥ or is a
finite ⊥-free normal form. In the past we have overlooked this construction, as the set of
λI-terms is not closed under reduction. In the limit a bound variable may “drop off”. In the
context of the ⊥-rule this is no problem because such terms reduce in one step to ⊥. There
is no need to consider infinite reduction as any finite λI-term has a finite Böhm tree.
I Lemma 4.1. Let U be an unsolvable λI-term. Then ¬U , U ∧ N , U ∨ N and U→N are
all unsolvable λI-terms, provided M and N are λI-terms.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 it only remains to show that ¬U , U ∧ N , U ∨ N and U→N are
λI-terms. But this follows from the fact that TI and FI are λI-terms. J
Hence we can encode three valued-logic in λIβ⊥ if we take as truth values TI,FI and ⊥.
I Lemma 4.2. Let U be an unsolvable λI-term. Then ¬U , U ∧ N , U ∨ N and U→N are
all unsolvable λI-terms, when N is an λI-terms.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 it only remains to show that ¬U , U ∧ N , U ∨ N and U→N are
λI-terms. But this follows from the fact that TI and FI are λI-terms. J
Thus, though we calculate them now with a different encoding of the Booleans, we find
again the truth tables of McCarthy’s three-valued sequential propositional logic of Figure 2.
5 Conclusion
The idea to solve Russell’s paradox with three-valued logic is not at all new. Feferman gives
various pointers in [17]. But the conjunctions and disjunctions of the three-valued logics
that are usually considered for that purpose all seem to be commutative in contrast to those
in the left-sequential McCarthy logic that we use here.
It is possible to refine the encoding further to make an encoding of ω-valued logic along
these lines in lambda calculus. The new truth values then correspond to the different shapes
of left spine that unsolvables can have. We see no further use for that.
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